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In this very extensive paper Professor Slob argues that, despite what he
identifies as the "Integration Problem", there is a role for the concept of truth in
argumentation. The concept he sees a place for he calls "deflationary truth". It
is remarkably like the performative view of truth put forward in the 1950's at
Oxford by Strawson and others, who thought they were explaining the meaning
of the word 'truth' when they said things like: "The word 'true' is used to endorse
or concede statements." (Strawson 1949) Compare Slob: "truth marks the
acceptance of theses that are no longer challenged".
The "Integration Problem" is a problem whose articulation he attributes to
Ralph Johnson, who raises it in this form: "a premise may be true but not
acceptable; a premise may be false but acceptable". If we take 'acceptable' in
this context to be short for 'acceptable to X' (where X refers to a particular
person), we can take the expression to mean 'regarded as true by X'. This is
my analysis of what Johnson has in mind, of course, but this interpretation
yields the maximum in paradoxicality in the above statement of the Integration
Problem.
On this interpretation of 'acceptable' I must confess that I do not find the
Integration Problem to be much of a problem at all. It simply reflects the fact
that sometimes our judgments of the truth value of propositions are later found
to be mistaken. That this can occur is a reassuring fact about the concept of
truth we operate with. If this never occurred we would have to conclude either
that we are omniscient or that our concept of truth is defective. All our
assertions would be like "I am here.", true whenever uttered.
Professor Slob, on the other hand, does see a serious problem here, once we
start describing disputes about particular claims. He conceives of two person
disputes involving a protagonist P and his/her opponent O as involving differing
perspectives, and that such disputes may not be settleable to the satisfaction
of P and O. P can get O to accept thesis "t" as true (in the deflationary sense of
'true'), he claims, only in one way: "The only way to achieve this, is when the
proponent succeeds in deriving support from what the opponent already
accepts." This restriction seems to follow from conceiving of disputants as
having incommensurable perspectives.
Slob presents one version of the incommensurable perspectives thesis in
conjunction with Allen's account of the Integration Problem in terms of
reasonableness: "a premise is acceptable just in case it is reasonable to
accept it". Slob comments: "But precisely what is reasonable to believe is up
to the standards of some perspective. It is perfectly suitable for an Azande to
believe in witchcraft ..."
This example only has force if we are talking about whether or not the Azande
can be criticized or faulted for having such beliefs. They cannot be faulted
because they have not had the opportunity to discover their errors. (One
reason for this is that the power of witchcraft is a matter of belief dependence,
so it works because they cooperate doxastically.) But even so the Azande are
mistaken if they regard witchcraft as a pure physical theory. Thus, their theory
can be criticized even though it would not be fair to criticize any individual
Azande. Slob's comment on this situation is revealing: "Neither is there any
possibility to criticize a perspective effectively, as inner perspectival
reasonableness simply disqualifies anything that does not cohere with it, no
position is liable to substantial criticism." This reflects a failure to distinguish
between the individual's rejection of criticism and legitimate criticism of the
position. A criticism can be legitimate even though the believer does not
accept it as such.
Professor Slob also supports his case for the "deflationary truth" concept by
arguing that one of the theories that offer a neutral standpoint for settling
disputes does not work. This is the correspondence theory of truth. According
to the theory, an asserted proposition is true if and only if there is an
appropriate fact corresponding to it. Slob's argument starts with the claim that
facts must be "mind independent" in a certain way if they are to be normative
for the truth value of propositions (or "thoughts", as he calls them). This is
correct. Then he discusses the nature of facts, and notes in particular that there
is a problem about how they are to be individuated. There seems no
alternative but to say that it is done linguistically. Now he sees a problem: "The
thought that snow is white demands as a corresponding fact that snow is white,
and not for instance that snow is frozen water. But how to distinguish the fact
that snow is white from the fact that snow is frozen water? How, in other words,
can it be individuated? The problem lies in the demand that a specific thought
must correspond to a specific fact. This demands that facts can be
individuated without relying on the thought they are supposed to make true."
This last assertion is, to my mind, an error. There are two different senses of
'rely on' involved here. To make the difference clear let us distinguish possible
facts from actual facts. A possible fact is individuated whenever an assertion is
made. If reality is such that the assertion turns out to correspond to an actual
fact then it is true. If no actual fact is found to correspond, then the assertion is
false. In this case we have attempted to state a fact but we have only
individuated a possible one. A possible fact relies on the assertion for its
identity, but the existence or nonexistence of the fact determines if the
assertion is true. So the reliances go in opposite directions and can happily
coexist.
Professor Slob's other attempt to refute talk about a full blooded concept of
truth involves the Kantian metaphysics: "The legacy ... of Kant ...is that the real
truth is set at a distance and that we only have access to the world as it
appears to us. It is this presumption, also, that underlies the idea that
something can be both acceptable and false, or not acceptable while true."
I think this is drawing the needed distinction in the wrong place. We can draw a
distinction between reality and appearance within our experience. Mirages and
apparently bent sticks protruding from water are examples. But we do not need
to be this esoteric to make a distinction between the true and the false
generally. If I assert that my rental car is a GM product, this assertion has a truth
value and any of you can establish it on having the car identified ostensively.
No impossible access to the noumenon is needed. To put the point one way,
we do not need access to the "real truth" to settle our disputes, since they are
engendered by experience in the first place.
In effect, Professor Slob is arguing against the possibility of appealing to the
noumena themselves to settle disputes arising from judgments about
perceptual experience. And, of course, this cannot be done since our only
access to the properties of things is through our sensory modalities. But I find
this puzzling. It is not as if one party has misperceived the object or state of
affairs when both have fully functioning sensory organs. If this were the case,
further investigation would resolve the dispute. If you and I look at an example
of the Muller Lyer figure and we disagree about whether the horizontal lines
were the same length, the matter could be settled by measuring the lines or
superimposing a replica of one line on the other. In general, it is almost always
possible to go beyond the information being relied on in arriving at different
judgments of the same matter. This is why we do not often get the stalemates
that the perspectivists imply we should get.
I could say much more about this very "meaty" paper, but I will end by raising a
misgiving about how Professor Slob conceives the relationship between truth
and acceptability. At one point he says that the truth requirement "is supposed
to establish the goodness of arguments", and in the same paragraph adds "the
truth requirement was dug up to ... be able to challenge acceptability where
needed". These passages give an impression that he thinks of the ordinary
concept of truth (as contrasted with the deflationary concept) as providing a
touchstone in premiss evaluation, as if it was a kind of Platonic concept that, if
possessed, would enable us to discern whether or not a premise were true.
But we cannot challenge someone's judgment that a premiss is unacceptable
by showing them the truth, or support our contrary judgment by merely affirming
its truth. If there is any concept to be utilized in arriving at an acceptability
judgment or truth value judgment, it is the concept of evidence. And in settling
arguments we are not stuck with what we and our opponent know, we can seek
additional evidence. This step will almost always lead to resolution.
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